Why You Shouldn’t Fucking Yawn When You Hear “Logic,” and Why There are Multiple Types of “Logics”

Difficulty: What the fuck

I’m not going to teach you how to do logic in this post. That would take many hour-long lessons just to cover the tip of a dick-shaped iceberg called “logic.”

Instead, I want you to be able to recognize different types of logic, the same way you can recognize German, Spanish, Arabic, Mandarin, and Korean—even if you don’t actually speak any of them.

Most people hear the word “logic” and immediately check out. Their brain goes:

“Hey, did you know there’s a sneaker sale this weekend?”

But fuck that. Logic is about clear thinking, and clear thinking is basically a superpower.

So let’s at least figure out what the different “dialects” of logic even are. We will briefly discuss the gist of:

  1. Classical Logic
  2. Modal Logic
  3. Intuitionistic Logic
  4. Relevance Logic
  5. Paraconsistent Logic

and bestow honorary mention on fuzzy logic at the end.

1. Classical Logic (The Default Setting)

This is the one most people unknowingly use.

It has two big rules:

(1) Big Rule 1: No contradictions allowed

You cannot have:

“Pringles are good”
and
“Pringles are not good”

both true at the same time, in the same sense.

This is called the Law of Non-Contradiction.

(2) Big Rule 2: No middle ground

A statement is either:

  • true, or
  • false

No in-between. No “kinda true.”

This is called the Law of Excluded Middle.

The really crazy rule: explosion

If you do allow a contradiction:

P and not-P

then everything becomes provable.

Yes—literally anything.

Example of Explosion

Start with:

It is raining AND it is not raining

From this, we can get:

It is raining
It is not raining

So far, so normal.

Now here’s the key move:

From:

It is raining

you can say:

It is raining OR the moon is made of cheese

(This is called addition—and yeah, it’s weird but legit.)

Now combine that with:

It is not raining

And use a rule (disjunctive syllogism):

If:

  • A or B
  • not A

Then:

  • B

So:

  • “It is raining OR the moon is made of cheese”
  • “It is not raining”

Therefore:

The moon is made of cheese

Boom. You just “proved” nonsense.

Moral of the story:

Contradictions break the system.

This is called:

  • Ex Falso Quodlibet
  • aka Explosion

One-liner:

Classical logic = “No contradictions, no gray area, or everything goes to shit.”

Now we level up.

Instead of just asking:

“Is this true?”

we ask:

“Does this HAVE to be true?”
“Could this be true?”

2. Modal Logic (Must / Might Logic)

While classical logic talks about things like what is actually true (like the fact that many Singaporean drivers are assholes), modal logic talks about things like:

  • You must wear a seatbelt.
  • Some Singaporean drivers might be assholes.
  • Some car accidents could happen

Classical logic is like:

“Cool story, but I only understand true/false.”

Modal logic is like:

“Let’s handle that shit properly.”

The Two Main Modal Words

□ (box) = MUST / necessarily

◇ (diamond) = POSSIBLE / maybe

Here’s a simple application to get you started:

□A = “A has to be true in all the situations we’re considering”

A = “A could be true in at least one situation”

And here’s an example:

“The toilet must be clogged.”

This means: in every possible situation we’re considering, the toilet must be clogged.

Here’s another one:

“The toilet might be clogged.”

This means: there is at least one possible situation where the toilet is clogged.

The key idea: “possible worlds”

This is the weird part, but we’ll keep it simple.

Modal logic imagines:

different ways reality could be

Not sci-fi necessarily. Just:

  • what might be true
  • what could have been true
  • what has to be true

Think of:

different “versions of reality”

Like:

  • World 1: it’s raining
  • World 2: it’s sunny
  • World 3: it’s cloudy

Now define the operators

◇A (possible A)

There is at least ONE world where A is true

□A (necessary A)

In EVERY world, A is true

Example

Statement:

“2 + 2 = 4”

  • □(2+2=4) → true (it’s true in all worlds)
  • ◇(2+2=4) → also true

Here’s another statement:

“It is raining”

then:

  • □(raining) means: it is raining in all accessible worlds
  • ◇(raining) means: it is raining in at least one accessible world

But suppose from the current world you can access three worlds:

  • World 1: raining
  • World 2: not raining
  • World 3: not raining

Then:

  • □(raining) is false, because not all accessible worlds have rain
  • ◇(raining) is true, because at least one accessible world has rain

And if you want to be a tad nerdier, here’s how we symbolize this raining stuff:

□(raining) = it’s raining everywhere

¬□(raining) = not everywhere is raining

◇(raining) = somewhere it is raining

□¬(raining) = nowhere is it raining

3. Intuitionistic Logic (a.k.a. “prove it or shut up” logic)

Core Attitude

“Don’t tell me something is true unless you can actually prove it.”

What They Hate

In normal logic, you can say:

“Either A is true OR A is false”

Even if you have zero evidence.

Intuitionists say:

“Nope. That’s lazy as hell.”

In kiddy language, we can say:

Normal logic:

“Either there’s treasure in that box or there isn’t.”

Intuitionistic logic:

“Have you opened the fucking box?”

If not:

“Then don’t claim shit.”

What changes?

In classical logic:

You can prove things using tricks like:

“If assuming NOT-A leads to nonsense, then A must be true”

This is called proof by contradiction.

In intuitionistic logic:

“No. That doesn’t count.”

They say:

“You didn’t prove A.
You just showed that not-A is bad. That’s not the same thing.”

Simple example

Classical logic says:

“There exists a number that has property X”

even if you can’t name it.

Intuitionistic logic says:

“Show me the number or shut the fuck up.”

One-line summary

Intuitionistic logic =
“No proof? No truth. Stop bullshitting.”

4. Relevance Logic (a.k.a. “don’t say random shit” logic)

Core attitude:

“The reason (A) should actually be related to the conclusion (B).”

What they hate

In classical logic, this is allowed:

From a false statement, you can prove ANYTHING.

Example:

  • “2+2=5”
  • therefore: “I am the King of Mars”

This, again, is called explosion.

Relevance logicians say:

“What the actual fuck? These are unrelated.”

Weird conditional (“if…then…” statement) problem: kiddy version

Normal logic:

“If unicorns exist, then I’m a sandwich”
This is true if unicorns don’t exist.

Relevance logic:

“Dude… unicorns and sandwiches have nothing to do with each other.
This is bullshit. Reject.”

What changes?

Relevance logic demands:

A must actually have something to do with B.

You can’t just glue random sentences together with “if.”

Example

Classical logic allows:

“If 2+2=5, then the sky is blue.”

Relevance logic says:

“Nope. That’s not a real conditional. That’s just nonsense dressed up.”

One-line summary

Relevance logic =
“Your premise better actually connect to your conclusion, you dumbass.”

Why this pissed people off

Some philosophers said:

“Wait… real life systems have contradictions all the time.”

Examples:

  • laws that conflict
  • people who believe inconsistent things
  • messy databases
  • paradoxes

And they thought:

“Why should ONE contradiction destroy EVERYTHING?”


5. Paraconsistent Logic

Core idea:

“Even if there’s a contradiction, don’t let everything go to shit.”

What they reject

They reject this rule:

From A and not-A, you can prove anything

They say:

“No. That’s way too extreme.”

Kiddy version

Normal logic:

“If your notebook has ONE contradiction, we burn the whole fucking notebook.”

Paraconsistent logic:

“Relax. One bad page doesn’t mean the whole notebook is garbage.”

Concrete example

Suppose your system says:

  • “This website is safe”
  • “This website is not safe”

Classical logic says:

“Cool, now I can prove the website is run by aliens.”

Total nonsense is allowed.

What they are trying to do

They are trying to:

contain the damage

Instead of:

letting one contradiction explode into total chaos

Another kiddy version

Classical logic:

One rotten apple → burn the whole farm

Paraconsistent logic:

One rotten apple → throw it out, keep eating

Important: they are NOT saying

“Contradictions are good”

They are saying:

“Contradictions shouldn’t destroy everything”

Why this actually matters

Because in real life:

  • legal systems contradict themselves
  • large databases have errors
  • people hold inconsistent beliefs

If we used classical logic strictly:

everything would become meaningless instantly

So paraconsistent logic says:

“Let’s build a system that can survive inconsistency.”

One-line Summary

Paraconsistent logic =
“Even if shit contradicts, don’t let the whole system lose its mind.”

Final comparison (all five now)

Logic TypeAttitude
Classical“Contradiction = everything explodes”
ModalAdd “necessity and possibility”
Intuitionistic“No proof = no truth”
Relevance“No connection = bullshit”
Paraconsistent“Contradiction ≠ total disaster”

Conclusion and a brief note on fuzzy logic

These are five major types of philosophical logics. (And there are more… many more.) Some of these logics extend classical logic. Others reject parts of it entirely. In the future, we will cover them in more depth as well as briefly discuss fuzzy logic, which, contrary to popular belief, is not a synonym for “sloppy thinking.” (It’s a specialty that math and engineering people love and has legit philosophical relevance… just not center stage.)

That’s all for now!

What the Fuck Does “Proof” Even Mean? (And Why It Doesn’t Guarantee Truth)

Difficulty: What the fuck

This is the kind of weird shit logicians study in something called “metalogic.”

Briefly: Much confusion arises from the term “prove.” If I can prove something, doesn’t that just mean that that thing is true?

Not necessarily.

In logic (and analytic philosophy), “prove” has a different meaning from everyday usage. All it means here is: I can arrive at some conclusion if I follow the rules in a system.

Imagine that you’re playing a game called “Math for Morons.” The game is the aforementioned system, and the rules of that system include the following:

  • 1+1 = 2
  • 1 + 1 = 3

According to the rules of the “Math for Morons” system, you can then prove 2 = 3. But that doesn’t mean that it’s true that 2 = 3. The point being? Proof (according to the definition of “proof” in logic class) doesn’t guarantee truth.

And if you can prove something in the logical sense but still not arrive at the truth? That means the system is broken. Logicians call a broken system like this inconsistent.

Logicians even have a symbol for this kind of provability: ⊢ (the single turnstile).

But what if it’s the other way around? That is, something is true, but you can’t prove it.

This is what logicians call incompleteness.

Incompleteness:

  • does NOT mean “true but very hard to prove” (like the fact that my dad is an asshole—hard to prove, but not what logicians mean here)
  • means “true but you can’t prove it using the rules you have in your system/game” In other words: the truth is out there, but your system is too weak to reach it.

So imagine that in your “Math for Morons” system, there are no rules at all about even and odd numbers.

But it’s TRUE that

“2 is an even number.”

Then even though it’s true that 2 is even, you can’t prove it within the system, because the system simply doesn’t have the tools to express or derive that fact.

Logicians also have a different symbol for completeness: ⊨ (the double turnstile).

Roughly speaking, this doesn’t mean “you can prove it.”

It means:

“This has to be true, no matter how you interpret things.”

So metalogic asks a deeper question:

Do the things you can prove (⊢) line up with the things that are actually guaranteed to be true (⊨)?

Or are you just pushing symbols around and hoping for the best?

By the way, in standard (“classical”) logic, there’s a nice result:

If you can prove something using the rules (), then it really is true in the relevant sense ().

Logicians call this soundness.

But that’s another can of worms for another day.

Theories of Meaning Part 1: What the Hell Does “Meaning” Even Mean? (Without the Bullshit)

Difficulty: What the hell

What the Hell Does “Meaning” Even Mean? (Without the Bullshit)

This is a profane, simplified version of part of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article “Theories of Meaning.” The goal here is simple: strip away unnecessary jargon so that people—myself included—can actually understand what the hell is going on, without dumbing things down too much. This is Part 1 of a series. I’ll come back to other parts of the article over time—but each post will stand on its own.

The One-Sentence Version

There are two different questions about meaning:

  1. What does this word mean?
  2. Why does it mean that?

Philosophers constantly mix these up, and that’s where a lot of confusion—and yes, bullshit—comes from.

Two Kinds of Theory of Meaning

Philosophers use the phrase “theory of meaning” in at least two different ways. To avoid confusion, we’re going to separate them cleanly:

  • Semantic theory = What does this shit mean?
  • Foundational theory = Why the fuck does it mean that?

That’s the whole game.

What Is a Semantic Theory?

Take a simple example:

“Dog” = a (usually) furry animal that barks

That’s the kind of thing a semantic theory does. It tells you what words and sentences mean.

Think of it like an ultra-precise dictionary. It answers questions like:

  • What does “dog” mean?
  • What does “snow is white” mean?
  • When is a sentence true?

It’s just describing meanings. No deep explanation yet. Just mapping words to what they mean.

What Is a Foundational Theory?

Now we go one level deeper:

Why does the word “dog” mean what it means?

Is it because:

  • we use it that way?
  • society agrees on it?
  • there’s some connection between words and the world?
  • something psychological is going on in our heads?

Now we’re asking a completely different kind of question.

A foundational theory of meaning is trying to explain:

What makes it the case that words have the meanings they do in the first place?

So instead of:

“What the fuck does ‘dog’ mean?”

we’re asking:

“Why the fuck does ‘dog’ mean that?”

That’s not description anymore. That’s explanation.

The Anthropologist Example

This is where things get really clear.

Imagine an anthropologist studying some distant tribe.

Step 1: Just describe the rules

They figure out:

  • Slurping = polite
  • Burping = fine
  • Farting = not fine

That’s just a description of how things work in that culture.

That’s like a semantic theory.

Step 2: Explain the rules

Now the anthropologist asks:

Why are these the rules?

Why this system instead of a different one?

Maybe it’s because of:

  • culture
  • social pressure
  • history
  • power structures
  • evolutionary factors

Now they’re explaining the system, not just describing it.

That’s like a foundational theory.

These Two Things Are Different (But Related)

Let’s make this really clear:

  • A semantic theory is like a dictionary
  • A foundational theory is like asking why the dictionary works the way it does

They are different jobs.

But—and this matters—they can still influence each other.

When Semantic Theories Affect Foundational Theories

Suppose your dictionary says:

“Dog” = an animal that moos and becomes beef

Okay, something has gone horribly wrong.

Now you might ask:

What the hell explains this messed-up system?

So problems at the semantic level can push us to rethink our foundational explanation.

When Foundational Theories Affect Semantic Theories

Now flip it.

Suppose you discover that the meanings in your “dictionary” were formed in some unreliable way—bad evidence, confusion, whatever.

Then you might say:

Maybe our definitions themselves need to be fixed.

So your theory of how meaning works can force you to revise your actual definitions.

Quick Summary

  • Semantic theory = what words mean
  • Foundational theory = why they mean that

Different questions. Different jobs. Constantly confused.

The Skeptic Bomb

Now for the fun part.

Some philosophers—like W. V. O. Quine and Saul Kripke—basically say:

“What if meaning isn’t even a real thing?”

As in:

  • There may be no objective fact about what words really mean

If they’re right, then:

  • There’s no semantic theory (nothing real to describe)
  • There’s no foundational theory (nothing real to explain)

Everything collapses.

We’re not going down that rabbit hole right now.

That shit gets deep fast.

Final Thought

If you take nothing else away from this:

Don’t confuse “What does this mean?” with “Why does it mean that?”

Philosophers do it all the time.

You don’t have to.