What the Hell Bullshit Is: Addressing Potential Objections

Difficulty: What the hell

In my previous post on bullshit, I argued for a revision of Harry Frankfurt’s definition of bullshit, redefining it as follows:

Bullshit is (a) speech or deed that simulates adherence to standards of reasoning and truth without a genuine concern to get things right, or (b) speech or deed that displays indifference to any relevant standards of correctness.

I also formulated a more layman-friendly, if less precise, version of my definition:

Bullshit is pretending to play by the rules while not actually giving a shit about them—or simply not caring about them at all

What followed was a discussion on salient types of bullshit which Frankfurt’s definition struggles to capture, but which, I argued, my revised definition handles better.

In what follows, I will first offer a caveat on defining bullshit before turning to objections and counterexamples to my revised definition.

A caveat on definitions

So first, there’s something that Frankfurt states in his work On Bullshit that we need to keep in mind:

“Any suggestion about what conditions are logically both necessary and sufficient for the constitution of bullshit is bound to be somewhat arbitrary. For one thing, the expression bullshit is often employed quite loosely—simply as a generic term of abuse, with no very specific literal meaning. For another, the phenomenon itself is so vast and amorphous that no crisp and perspicuous analysis of its concept can avoid being Procrustean.”

Here, Frankfurt briefly argues that because bullshit is such a messy concept, no definition of bullshit can be perfect, and any attempt to construct an ultra-precise definition would end up being Procrustean (overly rigid). As such, there will likely be overgeneration (some instances of non-bullshit might be captured) and undergeneration (some instances of bullshit might not be captured) no matter what definition we come up with.

That said, my aim is to minimize, as much as I can, issues of overgeneration and undergeneration, the former of which is especially problematic on Frankfurt’s original definition. The goal is not to provide a perfect revised definition, but one that handles our messy conception of bullshit a little more adroitly. To that end, I will further refine my revised definition along the way.

Objections and counterexamples

Overgeneration

Case 1: The psychopathic serial killer

Consider a psychopathic serial killer who murders without any regard for moral or social norms. On my definition, such a person would seem to satisfy condition (b): she is indifferent to any relevant standards of correctness. But it would be highly inappropriate to describe her actions as “bullshit.” Murder is not bullshit—it is something far worse.

This suggests that my definition may overgenerate: it risks classifying extreme forms of wrongdoing as bullshit, when in fact the concept seems better suited to a narrower class of intellectual or expressive failures.

Case 2: The reckless driver

A reckless driver has no regard for traffic laws and social norms. This follows (b) because plausibly, the driver “displays indifference to any relevant standards of correctness.” However, it would not be apt to say that the “driver is bullshitting” or that “her driving is bullshit.”

This is another case of potential overgeneration.

Case 3: The bored vandal

Again, potential overgeneration.

Case 4: The apathetic employee

An apathetic employee doesn’t care about doing a good job, ignores standards, and does just the bare minimum. This follows (b) (an indifference to any relevant standards of correctness), but it feels strange to say that the “employee is bullshitting.”

This is the last of the cases of potential overgeneration.

Addressing overgeneration objections

This is where we can refine my definition of bullshit, which, if you recall, states:

Bullshit is (a) speech or deed that simulates adherence to standards of reasoning and truth without a genuine concern to get things right, or (b) speech or deed that displays indifference to any relevant standards of correctness.

And because all the aforementioned objections to potential overgeneration target (b), we will have to home in on (b)’s wording, specifically for “relevant.” So what are “relevant standards of correctness”? I stipulate:

A relevant standard of correctness is one that is representational.

If you want to specify that in my definition, we can word it as:

Bullshit is (a) speech or deed that simulates adherence to standards of reasoning and truth without a genuine concern to get things right, or (b) speech or deed that displays indifference to any relevant standards of representational correctness.

This addresses cases 1 to 3.

For case 1 (the psychopathic serial killer), murder is not bullshit because it is not relevant to standards of representational correctness. Sure, there are behavioral norms and laws, and these are standards of correctness, but they do not concern matters of representation–such as representing some claim as true or false, or reasoning as fallacious or not, or a question as sincere or insincere.

Instead, these norms and laws govern matters like public safety and social mores.

And the same could be said about case 2 (the reckless driver) and case 3 (the bored vandal), both of which do not concern the relevant issue of representation.

Now I argue that case 4 (the apathetic employee) is in fact a case of bullshit. While it might seem strange to say that “the employee is bullshitting,” it’s quite intuitive to say that any work she produces is “bullshit” due to her indifference to “any relevant standards of representational correctness.”

Undergeneration

Case 5: The sincere-but-self-deceived bullshitter

Say we have a charismatic speaker (think wellness guru, motivational influencer) who is sincerely convinced of what she’s saying, cares about getting things right (in their own mind), presents confident, sweeping claims with “reasons.” But she ignores counterevidence, cherry-picks anecdotes, and overstates conclusions.

This is clearly a case of bullshit. However, although it seems to be neither (a) speech or deed that simulates adherence to standards of reasoning and truth without a genuine concern to get things right, nor (b) speech or deed that displays indifference to any relevant standards of representational correctness, my definition might fail to capture it.

Case 6: The self-deceptive ideologue

A partisan argues with apparent structure and confidence, genuinely believes her claims, and wants to be right. But she systematically filters evidence, rationalizes away disconfirming data, and uses arguments instrumentally (without noticing). Our intuition is to call this “bullshit.”

The objection here is that although there seems to be a “concern to get things right,” there seems to be a distorted epistemic (knowledge) practice that my definition might not capture. So like case 5, this is potentially a problem of undergeneration.

Case 7: The therapeutic “truth”

A therapist/coach says:

“You’re enough exactly as you are. Everything happens for a reason.”

Her advice is not offered as literal truth. It’s aimed at helping, not accuracy. And the speaker may even know it’s not strictly true.

This serves as a potential counterexample of undergeneration to my definition because it’s not clearly (a), as it doesn’t simulate, or pretend to be, adherence to standards of reasoning and truth. Moreover, there does seem to be a genuine concern to get things right. And it’s not (b): the therapist/coach is not indifferent, as there is a different aim (well-being) she cares about. Nevertheless, our intuition is that while some people might hear this as helpful, others might appropriately call it “feel-good bullshit.”

Case 8: The PR spin that believes itself

Now consider a corporate spokesperson who uses polished talking points, believes the narrative, and wants to be accurate within that frame. But her language is evasive and selectively framed to mislead.

This is an instance that might not follow (a), as there is no deliberate simulation of adherence to standards of truth and reasoning. And neither does it follow (b), since the spokesperson is not indifferent, and she cares about being “correct” in the approved frame. Still, this is obviously bullshit.

Addressing undergeneration objections

To address these undergeneration objections, we must home in on the word “genuine.”

Bullshit is (a) speech or deed that simulates adherence to standards of reasoning and truth without a genuine concern to get things right, or (b) speech or deed that displays indifference to any relevant standards of representational correctness.

Note that I used the word “genuine,” not “sincere,” because while these two concepts might often be related, they are not identical.

A manufacturer of boutique handbag knockoffs can be sincerely focused on her craft (as might be the case for many higher-quality, Chinese-made knockoffs), but that doesn’t mean the knockoffs are genuine. These handbags, then, can, in an extended sense, be called “bullshit products.”

Conversely, an original product might be genuine, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that the manufacturer sincerely gave a shit about them. It thus aligns with my definition of bullshit to say these products are not bullshit.

More philosophically, sincerity is a mental state. Genuineness is a mind-independent matter of being properly guided. In these cases of potential undergeneration, the bullshitters’ concern is sincere but not genuine, because it is not properly guided by the standards it must respect.

So, in case 5, the wellness guru might sincerely be concerned to get things right, but because her concern is deeply misguided, she does not have a genuine concern.

The same goes for case 6 (the self-deceptive ideologue), case 7 (the therapeutic “truth”), and case 8 (the PR spin that believes itself), in which the bullshitters are engaged in a sincere adherence to standards of reasoning and truth. Their adherence is not genuine because it is not properly guided by the standards of reasoning and truth that it must respect.

The takeaway

So based on these last two posts, what can we conclude about my definition of bullshit?

First, it captures salient instances of bullshit that Frankfurt’s definition struggles to include.

Second, my definition avoids some potential counterexamples and objections regarding both overgeneration and undergeneration.

In sum, to accomplish this, we must not restrict our definition of bullshit to a concern with just truth, as Frankfurt did. And we should also carefully explain not just what “bullshit” means, but what certain terms in our definition mean.

So much for my definition of bullshit. We will cover the ethical implications of bullshitting in the future. Until next time then.