Difficulty: What the hell
Defining another species of bullshit
So somebody just called me for the second time in three days–past 10 p.m., no less. The first time, I answered her call reluctantly. This time, I refused to pick up, so she called yet again. Then she texted my wife, telling her to let me know that I’d missed the calls.
I knew what the caller wanted: unpaid labor, outside normal hours, framed as if it were an ordinary and acceptable request. She was presumptuous. She was exploitative. She unfairly attempted to impose upon me an illegitimate expectation disguised as something normal. In other words, what she was doing was presumptuous, exploitative bullshit.
This got me thinking: could my own definition of classic, representational bullshit somehow be applied to this case? Recall my definition:
Bullshit is (a) speech or deed that simulates adherence to standards of reasoning or truth without a genuine concern to get things right, or (b) speech or deed that displays indifference to any relevant standards of representational correctness.
Unless we do some tortuous argumentative gymnastics, the answer is: not really. So instead, I am setting out to capture this different species of bullshit with a different definition, one that will hopefully help explain the conceptual connections between presumptuous or exploitative bullshit and the classic representational species I’ve already defined. Here it is:
Presumptuous or exploitative bullshit is speech or deed that simulates the legitimacy of a request, expectation, or social claim without being genuinely guided by the norms of fairness, reciprocity, or boundary-respect that would make it appropriate.
What immediately jumps out is that both classic bullshit and presumptuous or exploitative bullshit involve a simulation of normative legitimacy without being properly guided by the relevant norms. Indeed, this points to something Frankfurt explained in On Bullshit: that while bullshit products are often defective, they need not be.
My definitions have also tracked the genuineness—or lack thereof—of the bullshitter’s concern. Genuineness is not the same as sincerity: a bullshitter can sincerely believe that she is following the norms or standards she must follow given what she is engaged in. But that doesn’t mean she’s not producing bullshit–that just means she’s bullshitting both you and herself.
Thus, the caller might be so deep into her own bullshit that she sincerely believes that she’s not doing anything inappropriate. Still, “This is fucking bullshit” seems like exactly the right response to her conduct.
Note that presumptuous and exploitative bullshit is not the same thing as being simply presumptuous and exploitative–an asshole is presumptuous, but assholes often do not even simulate conformity to a relevant standard or norm. Someone who employs child labor is exploitative, but that also doesn’t mean she simulates adherence to some standard or norm. So the defining feature of presumptuous or exploitative bullshit is not merely the absence of genuine guidance by the relevant norms. It is the simulation of legitimacy under those norms.
The ethical implications of presumptuous or exploitative bullshit
Now we get to the crux of the issue: why do we find presumptuous or exploitative bullshit morally objectionable?
Recall that classic representational bullshit is morally objectionable for at least three reasons:
(1) It is disrespectful because the bullshitter treats her victim as a means to an end.
(2) It is unfair because the bullshitter seizes the social authority that comes with sounding as if one is trying to get things right, without taking on the burden of actually doing so.
(3) It is socially corrosive because it makes it hard to distinguish genuine inquiry from empty performance, degrading the very practices on which intellectual and civic life depend.
I argue that presumptuous or exploitative bullshit is bad for similar reasons.
First, it is disrespectful–the presumptuous or exploitative bullshitter, in virtue of her arrogance or exploitative conduct, treats the victim as a means to an end. She acts as if her own wants automatically generate claims on other people’s time, labor, or goodwill, while the other person’s competing claims are treated as secondary or negligible.
Second, it is unfair–the presumptuous or exploitative bullshitter, by cheapening or bypassing the norms of fairness, reciprocity, or boundary-respect, undermines the level playing field that governs social norms. Further, she turns the tables. I didn’t have to answer her calls, and I didn’t have to do what she wanted. But by refusing to pick up or call back, I now look like the asshole.
Third, it is socially corrosive–because many of us find it so awkward to confront this kind of bullshit, it often goes unchallenged. That makes the tactic socially easier to repeat, and over time it can normalize a culture of entitlement and imposition.
I’m embarrassed to say that after refusing to pick up the phone, I texted the caller back. As expected, she promptly called me again, and I, disgusted at myself, answered her call.
Why, though, is this embarrassing? My guess is that by tacitly condoning her conduct, I submit myself to an authority she does not really have and thereby undermine my own dignity as a person. I allow her to use me. And by doing so, I also risk contributing to the proliferation of bullshit.
To be sure, the caller was polite on the phone, as she always was. She also asked if it was a good time to call me. But she did so after the fact, which suggests that her adherence to social norms was merely a simulation.
The reason this matters philosophically is that this sort of bullshit often works precisely by making resistance feel rude, disproportionate, or socially awkward. This is why bullshit is so insidious and pernicious. Because we tend to condemn liars more readily than bullshitters, we are often ill-equipped to deal with the bullshit that is so prevalent in our lives. We let it slide. And that’s not right.
Philosophy without Bullshit 